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THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AGENDA
FOR THE NEXT DECADE
JEFFREY S. LUBBERS'
The flyer for this symposium asks: Is administrative law at a cross-
roads?
My answer might be the same as that of the Chinese monk who was
recently asked his opinion of the French Revolution. His response was,
"It's too early to tell." Or I might give vent to bitterness and exclaim that
of course administrative law is at a crossroads since the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) is gone, and administrative law
will have to fend for itself.
My real, more dispassionate answer, is that as a general supporter and
defender of the Administrative Procedure Act' over the years, I believe that
we have narrowly averted coming to a crossroads this year. By that I
mean, if the major regulatory reform legislation had passed in the form
under consideration throughout last year,' it would have been a major
departure requiring significant changes in the way the government operates,
not to mention revision of the administrative law casebooks.
Those bills, however, have not passed. In their place, a more modest
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA)3
was enacted on March 29th after a unanimous vote in the Senate.' I do
not think SBREFA is a landmark, though it will probably cause some
consternation at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
* Fellow in Administrative Law and Adjunct Professor, Washington College of Law,
American University. A.B., Cornell University; J.D., University of Chicago Law School.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994).
2. See Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Procedure Legislation in 1946 and 1996:
Should We Be Jubilant at this Jubilee?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 55 (1996).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 857 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
4. See 142 CONG. REC. S3242-02 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996).
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which are singled
out for an unprecedented degree of oversight before they may issue rules.'
I thought I could best aid this program by putting on my old hat of
research director at ACUS and offering a few thoughts as to which issues
and topics are most likely to dominate the administrative law agenda in the
coming years.
The first major issue is how agencies can do more with less. Agencies
have many new responsibilities and are required to do much more analysis
than they used to do. These include strategic plans and program evalua-
tions under the Government Performance and Results Act,6 cost-benefit
analyses,7 "takings" analyses,8 regulatory flexibility analyses,9 litigation
impact analyses,'0 unfunded mandate analyses," and our old standby,
environmental impact statements, 2 all at a time when agencies' budgets
in real dollar terms are being sharply reduced, when experienced personnel
are leaving through buyouts, and when younger recruits are being turned
away, or even worse, turned off from government service.
5. The law requires that before "covered agencies- may issue any rule having a
significant impact on small entities, they must convene a review panel comprised of agency,
OMB and SBA officials. The panel must obtain input from representatives of small entities
and must file a report with the agency within 60 days that is included in the rulemaking
process. Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 244, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. ( 10 Stat.) at 867. The EPA and
OSHA are the only covered agencies listed in the Act. Id. §244(d). See generallyThomas
0. Sargentich, The Small BusinessRegulatoryEnforcementFairnessAct, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
123 (1996) (explaining new procedural requirements on afflicted agencies and potential
impact of changes).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 306 (1994).
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994).
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994) (requiring agencies to take into account cost to U.S. Treasury for just compensation
claims when making new regulations).
9. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (Supp. 1996), amended by Pub.
L. No. 104-121, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 847.
10. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (1996) (requiring that proposed
regulations "shall be written to minimize litigation").
11. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.)
48 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). Specifically, § 1532 of the act man-
dates analysis. Id. § 1532.
12. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(1) (1994)
(requiring agencies to provide environmental impact statements with actions, including
regulations, that significantly affect environment).
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What do downsizing and budget-cutting mean for administrative law
generally? 3 I think they put a new emphasis on several aspects of the
regulatory process. On the larger, macro level, there will be a need to
prioritize among agency regulatory targets, so I would expect renewed
interest in regulatory cost accounting' 4 and in the concept of a national
regulatory budget."
At the program level, there must be much more attention paid to
developing alternative approaches to regulation. First, agencies must
develop regulations that are more effective, yet less burdensome and more
acceptable to the regulated community. In this regard, ACUS did some
pioneering work in the area of negotiated rulemaking.' 6 We also looked
at the need to take advantage of voluntary industry consensus standards'7
and the need to achieve international harmonization of regulations." I
think a lot more research is needed in all those areas.
13. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of
Diminishing Agency Resources, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1996) (explaining doctrinal
implications of present trend to increase agencies' mandates while decreasing funds
necessary to fulfill those mandates). See also Mike Causey, Big Shrink, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 1996, at B2 (reporting fact that federal employment levels are at lowest since Kennedy
Administration).
14. See Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-89 (1995)
(Dole Amendment No. 1987, substituting revised version of S. 343, containing § 7,
Regulatory Accounting).
15. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES 3-7
(Apr. 1, 1991 - Mar. 31, 1992) (discussing possibility of government creating fiscal budget
process to govern federal regulatory expenditures). See also Thomas D. Morgan, The
Regulatory Budget: The Illusion of Rationality in Regulatory Policy Making (Dec. 1989)
(unpublished draft report to ACUS) (finding regulatory budget concept to be unworkable as
practical matter).
16. ACUS Recommendations 82-4, 85-5: Procedures for Negotiating Proposed
Regulations, I C.F.R. §§ 305.82-4, 305.85-5 (1993). See also ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1995)
(providing guidelines and references for federal agencies to use when undertaking negotiated
rulemaking); Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the
Administrative Process, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 251, 275-78 (1996) (commenting on
innovative steps taken by administrative law community, including negotiated rulemaking).
17. ACUS Recommendation 78-4: Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard-
Setting Organizations in Health and Safety Regulation, I C.F.R. § 305.78-4 (1993).
18. ACUS Recommendation 91-1: Federal Agency Cooperation with Foreign
Government Regulators, I C.F.R. § 305.91-1 (1993). See also George A. Bermann,
Regulatory Cooperation Between the European Commission and the U. S. Administrative
Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 933, 954-83 (1996) (examining European Commission
practices and policies concerning regulatory dialogue with United States and concluding with
prescriptions for more effective regulatory cooperation).
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Second, there will be a need to develop new approaches to enforcement.
At ACUS, we began to look at ways that agencies could leverage their
enforcement resources through the use of audited self-regulation.' 9 For
example, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies on
intermediaries such as the stock exchanges to do the front-line regulating,
while the SEC serves as a backstop and overseer of the way the stock
exchanges do the regulating.
We also began to look at what we called cooperative enforce-
ment-reliance on the employees of the regulated entity itself rather than
a third-party intermediary.2" The best known example of this is the
method that has just been adopted in a food safety regulation called Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point.2' It is a real mouthful, but the
process focuses on production, not the sampling of the end products. The
agency approves the company's plan, reviews operating records, and
verifies that the program is working. It brings to mind President Reagan's
favorite phrase, "trust but verify."
There is a lot more that needs to be done in this area of alternative
enforcement. What about qui tam actions under the False Claims Act,22
often referred to as the "bounty hunter" provisions?23 What about
insurance-based regulations or contract-based regulations, or the continued
development of systems for trading of pollution credits and other market-
able rights?24 What about the increasing reliance on waivers and excep-
19. See ACUS Recommendation 94-1: The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701 (1994) (suggesting that agencies delegate power
to private self-regulatory organizations, provided conditions promote effectiveness and
organization operates fairly); Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-
Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 181 (1995) (listing
advantages of audited self-regulation).
20. See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations (Dec.
1995) (unpublished report of ACUS) (providing examples and suggesting conditions for use
of this technique).
21. See Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
Systems; Final Rule, Dept. of Agriculture, Food Safety & Inspection Service, 61 Fed. Reg.
38,805 (July 25, 1996) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 417).
22. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
23. See Robert Vogel, Invasion of the Bounty Hunters, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992,
at 13 (discussing whistleblower provision of False Claims Act, allowing individual acting
for United States to file suit and share in government's recovery).
24. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651 (1994)
(establishing allowance trading system for sulfur dioxide emissions from utilities).
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tions? What process is required for waivers? Is it rulemaking or
adjudication? This is a neglected area.2"
Agencies will have to devote much more attention to prioritization.
They will have to develop better ways to decide on the best targets for
regulation, for standard setting, and for enforcement. Some pioneering
work was done by the EPA Science Advisory Board 6 in trying to set
priorities among all the environmental hazards that EPA might choose.27
Such efforts need to be expanded.
Finally, I think that budget stringency will mean that the movement
toward alternative dispute resolution (ADR) can only accelerate. Every
enforcement case that is mediated saves the government many times the
cost of the mediation.28 I think the emerging industry of providing ADR
to government agencies will certainly grow.
In addition to budget reductions, a second major watch area is the
tension between the Legislative and Executive Branches. We have seen a
seesawing of control of both the presidency and Congress between the two
political parties in the last few years, so it is not surprising that these new
tensions have developed.
In -the Reagan-Bush years, the Democratic Congress was trying to force
a balky executive to enforce regulatory laws. Now, of course, activist
executive agencies have their hands tied by Congress, which is using the
power of the purse to de-fund agencies.29
New laws will likely have a profound bearing on this tension. One
example is SBREFA, which I mentioned earlier." That law contains
another major title that requires agencies to submit all final rules to
25. See Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and
the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exception Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 167
n.6 (noting that "[r]emarkably, the exceptions process has received scant scholarly
attention"). But see Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991).
26. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.25(c) (1995) (describing board's responsibility).
27. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE
RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, REDUCING RISKS: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (1990).
28. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, TOWARD IMPROVED
AGENCY DISPUTE RESOLUTION: IMPLEMENTING THE ADR ACT (1995) (detailing agencies'
savings through use of ADR).
29. See, e.g., Stephen Barr, Cuts Frustrate OSHA Plans to Improve Worker Safety,
WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1996, at Al.
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Congress before they become effective-the constitutional form of the
"legislative veto."'"
Major rules cannot become effective until they are sent to Congress for
sixty days. This gives Congress a chance to trigger a shortcut method of
legislating by passing a joint resolution, which then has to be signed by the
President, who could disapprove the rule." This new law raises many
questions about how the potential of direct congressional involvement in the
rulemaking process will change the dynamics of rulemaking, agency-
congressional relations in appropriations and oversight activities, and even
how Congress itself operates.
Additionally, a special problem will develop at the end of each Congress
because any final rule promulgated in the last sixty "legislative"33 days of
a congressional term must be considered, for the purpose of this new law,
as being introduced fifteen days into the subsequent Congress; therefore, it
will likely result in a lot of jockeying at the end of each Congress to issue
rules before this rather indeterminate deadline takes effect.
Other new laws will also affect this balance. The line-item veto
legislation34 is scheduled to be signed by President Clinton today.35
Also, there is the Congressional Accountability Act,36 the first law
enacted by the 104th Congress, which applies many regulatory and
workplace laws to the Congress.
31. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 847, 868 (to be codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08).
32. The procedure is designed to avoid the constitutional problems that led to the
demise of the earlier version of the legislative veto. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (holding House veto of Attorney General's decision not to deport alien unconstitu-
tional because legislative character of vote required passage by majority of both houses of
Congress and presentation to President).
33. The law refers to 60 "session" days in the Senate and 60 "legislative" days in the
House of Representatives. See Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of
Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1996).
34. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1200 (to
be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 621, 681, 691-692).
35. The line-item veto allows the President to weed out "wasteful pork-barrel spending"
in an otherwise good piece of legislation. It gives the President the authority to veto
individual spending items and tax breaks in appropriations bills. The line-item veto was
passed by Congress on March 28, 1996, and signed into law by the President on April 9,
1996. The Pork Debate, WASH. POST, August 13, 1996, at AI0. A federal judge has since
dismissed a legal challenge to the line-item veto on the basis of a lack of standing. Ernie
Freda, On Washington: Court Refuses to Throw Out Line-Item Veto, ATLANTA J. AND
CONST., July 4, 1996, at 16A.
36. Pub. L. No. 104-10, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 3 (to be codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1348).
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The third major area, of course, is regulatory reform. Major efforts at
regulatory reform, like cicadas, seem to come in thirteen-year cycles,37 so
perhaps there will be a pause in present action to allow reflection on some
of the major unpassed aspects of this year's bills. For example, there has
been a great deal of experimentation in the last few administrations on
reviewing existing regulations.3" We should stop and see what we have
learned about that process before legislating it in stone.
The same goes for cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis. We simply do
not know enough to require new across-the-board requirements in these
areas. There are currently not enough practitioners of risk assessment in
the city to do everything required by the pending bills. 9  A better
approach would be to find some pilot programs at OSHA or the EPA to
test these ideas.
A fourth major area on everyone's list, I suspect, is the information
revolution. As the Internet washes over us all, what will this mean for
agency proceedings? Electronic rulemaking has already begun.40 Will we
shortly be seeing global rulemaking complete with chat rooms and word
searches of all records?
Agencies are beginning to computerize their documents as well. What
new problems likely will be caused by this? Issues include security,
confidentiality, hacking, authentication, need for backups, and access to
hard copies of documents for those who do not know how to get onto the
information highway. Moreover, how does our increasing reliance on e-
37. As Gary Edles has noted, there were major regulatory reform efforts in 1946
(APA); in 1959 (ABA proposes a Code of Administrative Procedure); in 1970 (ABA and
ACUS adopt resolutions calling for APA amendment); in 1982 (Senate passes regulatory
reform bill S. 108); and 1995 (Senate proposes Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of
1995). See Gary J. Edles, Regulatory Reform in 104th Congress, 14 ADMIN. L. NOTES I
(Fed. Bar Ass'n) (Summer 1995).
38. See generally Neil R. Eisner & Judith S. Kaleta, Federal Agency Reviews of
Existing Regulations, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 139 (1996) (offering suggestions to agencies on
how to streamline review of existing regulations while involving and educating public);
ACUS Recommendation 95-3: Review of Existing Agency Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,109
(1995) (addressing lack of norms for reviewing existing agency regulations).
39. See Hearings on S. 343 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 14
(1995) (statement of Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, OMB) (criticizing bill for requiring agency to perform "a full-blown risk assessment
... every time it makes any characterization about any risk" (emphasis in original)).
40. See Cindy Skryzcki, Modern Times: OSHA to Try Writing Rules in Cyberspace,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1994, at DI (reporting on use of computers in negotiated rulemaking
process in hope of eliminating paper and stimulating interaction); Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Request for Comments on Petition for Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,784
(1995) (containing instructions for filing through Internet).
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mail fit into our conceptions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), j
the Privacy Act,42 not to mention, of course, the Paperwork Reduction
Act?43  This area is going to require some enlightened and balanced
policymaking mixed with technical expertise. We all know that lawyers
and techies often do not get along; however, this is one area where
communication across the professions is necessary.
A fifth major area is federalism, what one might today call the
"devolution derby." The movement to devolve federal responsibility onto
state and local governments has potentially profound implications for both
federal and state administrative law. If federally funded programs, such as
Medicaid, Medicare, public housing, supplemental security income, food
stamps, and welfare are all turned into block grants and given over to the
states, what should the federal role be? Will the states, with their fifty
different administrative procedure acts, be able to handle the influx of
rulemaking and adjudication responsibilities that would suddenly hit them?
I think that state administrative law gets short shrift in most law schools
and in the bar.44  That will have to change if these laws are enacted;
therefore, I predict increased emphasis on state and local administrative
law.
Sixth, with the downsizing and retrenchment in the federal government,
I also foresee a renewed emphasis on the structures of administrative
agencies. Is the multi-member board or commission an expensive
anachronism? Is there such a thing as an independent agency, or should
there be? Why does Congress create three-member agencies, or even
worse, six-member commissions, like the Federal Election Commission and
the International Trade Commission, with all sorts of opportunities for
paralysis? Does it really make any difference if the EPA becomes a
Cabinet department? What about all the hybrids, such as government-
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). See generally ACUS Recommendation 88-10: Federal
Agency Use of Computers in Acquiring and Releasing Information, I C.F.R. § 305.88-10
(1993) (addressing difficulty of applying statutes and policies drafted with paper in mind to
electronic forms of information); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Acquisition and Release
of FederalAgency Information, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (1989) (discussing statutory policy
in favor of releasing information electronically and noting role that courts and Congress will
play in shaping and interpreting it).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
43. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1994). See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paperwork Redux: The
(Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 111 (1996).
44. There is one exception to the typical federal focus in administrative law taught in
law schools. MICHAEL AsIMow & ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
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sponsored enterprises," 5 government corporations,46 and administrative
quasi-courts, like the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion,47 that are split off from their rulemaking agencies? And what about
all the independent power centers developing within agencies:
presidentially-appointed general counsels, division heads, inspectors
general,48 chief financial officers,49 and so on?
My last major issue is administrative adjudication. I mentioned
expensive anachronisms. Sometimes I think that agencies believe that
administrative law judges (ALJs) fit that description.
I think the state of administrative adjudication is something that also
needs to be addressed again. It was not so long ago that then-Professor
Antonin Scalia began an article by saying "the subject of administrative
hearing officers is once again on the agenda of federal regulatory
reform." 50 That was 1979, just before the regulatory reform. bills of that
era fell short of passage.
Today Congress seems little concerned about the state of administrative
adjudication even though agencies seem to be using all sorts of non-ALJ
45. See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Federal Supervision of Safety and Soundness of
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 5 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 395 (1986).
46. One of the first government corporations was created during the Depression; an
independent government corporation called the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, which
distributed surplus food that would otherwise go to waste, was created out of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Ronen Shamir, The Relevanceof MoralAgendas,
109 HARV. L. REV. 846, 850 (1996). See also Aspen Law and Business, Witnesses Voice
Concerns with Proposalsfor RevampedPTO, 8 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 25 (1996) (discussing
proposal to create wholly-owned government corporation outside Commerce Department).
47. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) is an executive agency
in the Department of Labor that promulgates and enforces health and safety standards. The
purpose of OSHA is "to assure to every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions .... " 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1994). To carry out OSHA's
purpose, the Secretary of Labor has the power to set mandatory health and occupational
standards, as well as to enforce the implementation of these standards via inspections,
citations, and civil or criminal penalties. Id. §§ 651(b)(3), 657-59, 666. The act established
the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission as an independent agency that
would adjudicate enforcement actions brought by OSHA. Id. §§ 651(b)(3), 661. In 1991,
the Supreme Court in Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, referred to the division of
enforcement and interpretive powers within a regulatory scheme as a split-enforcement
structure.
48. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. (1994). See alsoPAUL C. LIGHT,
MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTOR GENERALS AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
(1993).
49. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 901.903 (1994) (creating position of chief financial officer in all
departments and other enumerated agencies.)
50. Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco--A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979).
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adjudicators instead of ALJs. In fact, other than the huge number of ALJs
in the Social Security Administration,5 the numbers at the other agencies
have fallen from 410 in 1978 to 273 at present.5 Meanwhile, agencies are
using thousands of other administrative hearing officers, administrative
judges, immigration judges, asylum officers, et cetera.
In my opinion, agencies have come to see ALJs as too expensive, too
difficult to appoint, and too hard to manage; therefore, they avoid using
them.54 I think this is a shame because it undermines the consistency,
uniformity, and independent adjudicative values that are at the heart of the
APA. 55
There are also some other adjudication issues. Is the AU corps bill, a
hardy perennial for fifteen years, dead?56 Is that a good thing or not?
How should we handle high-volume benefits programs such as the Social
Security Disability Program, which now has upwards of 500,000 hearings
a year with no sign of slowing down, or immigration adjudication, which
is burgeoning at a very fast rate? Which cases are best assigned to
agencies and which are best assigned to Article III courts or the more
specialized Article I courts?57 Is it time that the APA included a section
on informal adjudication?58 Can administrative tribunals handle mass tort
51. As of March 1996, there were 1,060 administrative law judges in the Social
Security Administration (figures supplied to Professor Lubbers by Office of Personnel
Management on March 1, 1996).
52. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?,
10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70 (1996) (describing "the drift away from ALJs").
53. Id. at 70-71. See also John H. Frye 111, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in
the Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (detailing use of non-ALJ presiding
officers by agencies).
54. Lubbers, supra note 52, at 72-74.
55. Id.
56. S. 104-486, H.R. 104-1802, 104th Cong. (1995). "This legislation would extract the
ALJs out of their employing agencies and locate them in a new agency that would be headed
by a presidentially appointed Chief ALJ ... [and an agency] that need[s] an ALJ would
have one assigned by the Corps." Lubbers, supra note 52, at 74-75. The proposal was first
introduced in 1980, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A UnifledCorps ofALJs: A Proposal to Test the
Idea at the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 273 (1981).
57. See generallyRichard H. Fal Ion, Jr., OfLegislativeCourts, AdministrativeAgencies,
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988) (describing constitutional relationships
between Article III courts and non-Article III courts).
58. This is not a new question. See Warren W. Gardner, The Procedures by Which
Informal Action Is Taken, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 158-66 (1972) (discussing need for
informal administrative procedures and proposing Informal Procedure Act of 1980).
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cases? 9 These are all questions that I think will be on the agenda in
coming years.
In closing, and forgive my obvious bias on this issue, let me stress the
need for a center of research and scholarship on administrative law in the
federal government. Now that ACUS is in the "former agency" section of
the U.S. Government Manual, the government lacks a locus of expertise on
administrative procedure. Of course, pockets of expertise remain,
especially in the Justice Department and the Office of Management and
Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. It is true, for
example, that the Department of Justice has units on ADR and on FOIA.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has taken over some of
ACUS's activities on ADR. The Office of Personnel Management
continues to oversee the ALJ program. But there is no place within the
government for concentrated research, consensus building, and developing
objective critiques of presidential and congressional initiatives. I think the
future of administrative law would be better if such a place were reestab-
lished.
59. See Wendy K. Mariner, Innovation and Challenge: The First Year of the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 1991 ACUS 409 (examining effectiveness of
administrative tribunal in handling tort cases arising from vaccinations required by state
law).
19971
